based on specific articulable facts, that an announced entry would result in danger to the officers or destruction of evidence. After examining the history and purposes of the knock-and-announce rule, this Note asserts that the Court improperly relied only on a historical analysis in its decision. By balancing the state's interest in unannounced entries against the occupants' Fourth Amendment interests, this Note concludes that the proposed rule would better protect the interests served by the knock-and-announce rule.
II. BACKGROUND
A.
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Origins of the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment was adopted as a response to the abusive search and seizure practices used by the British government during the American colonial period. 7 The colonists were particularly concerned about broad, unparticularized searches performed under the authority of general warrants. 8 General warrants authorized searches for persons or papers not named specifically in the warrant. The British government used general warrants in both England and America. In England, general warrants were widely used to suppress seditious publications. 9 One particularly influential incident involved the North Briton, a series of pamphlets criticizing government policies published anonymously by John Wilkes, a member of Parliament. 10 After a particularly critical issue of the pamphlet was published, the Secretary of State issued a general warrant to search for the people who published the pamphlets. I " Wilkes and others who had been searched and arrested challenged the warrant issued against them. 8 See, e.g., LANDYNSE!, supra note 7, at 30-31. 9 Marcus v. Search Warrants, 367 U.S. 717, 724 (1961) . See also LANDVNSR1, supra note 7, at 20-30; LASSON, supra note 7, at 42.
10 LASSON, supra note 7, at 43-46. 11 The warrant involved in the North Briton incident authorized four messengers of the Secretary of State "to make strict and diligent search for the authors, printers, and publishers of a seditious and treasonable paper, entitled, The North Briton, No. 45 .... and them, or any of them, having found, to apprehend and seize, together with their papers." Id. at 43. As the publication had been printed anonymously, the agents had complete discretion in determining whom to arrest and what to seize. The four agents arrested forty-nine people in the three days following the issuance of the warrant. Id. at 43-44.
12 Id. at 45.
to the narrow focus of the Amendment's protections were raised, and the Amendment's final text contained a clause protecting against any unreasonable search. 25 This history has persuaded the Supreme Court to recognize that the Fourth Amendment's Unreasonable Search Clause protects rights beyond those protected by the Warrant Clause.
2 6 Thus, the Court has interpreted the Unreasonable Search Clause to apply even to searches made with a warrant.
7

The Reasonableness Standard
The standard of reasonableness, based on the Unreasonable Search Clause, has emerged as the primary test of whether a given search is constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. 28 The reasonableness standard first surfaced in the Court's Fourth Amendment cases of the late 1940s and early 1950s, such as United States v. Rabinowitz, 29 where the Court used reasonableness to determine the proper scope of a search incident to an arrest. However, the Court did not fully develop the doctrine until Camara v. Municipal Court" and Terry v. Ohio,S1 where the Court used reasonableness to fashion broad exwarrants issuingwithout probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and not particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." LAsSON, supra note 7, at 101 (emphasis added). 25 The second draft of the Amendment changed the wording to:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated by warrants issuing without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and not particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Id.(emphasis added). This provision still clearly prohibits only the acts described in the original proposal, as noted during the Congressional debate:
Mr. Benson objected to the words "by warrants issuing." This declaratory provision was good as far as it went, but he thought it was not sufficient, he therefore proposed to alter it so as to read "and no warrant shall issue." The question was put on this motion, and lost by a considerable majority.
Id. (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 783 (1789)) (emphasis added).
Though the proposal was originally defeated in the House, Benson's change was eventually adopted and became the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 102. For the final text of the Fourth Amendment, see supra note 2. 26 Payton, 445 U.S. at 584-85. See also LAsSON, supra note 7, at 103. But see LANDYNSKI, supra note 7, at 43 (arguing that the Unreasonable Search Clause only emphasizes the Warrant Clause). 27 The Court has found searches conducted under proper warrants unreasonable. E.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 763-66 (1985) (holding the court-ordered surgical removal of a bullet from a suspect unreasonable); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (holding a search for personal papers under warrant unreasonable). The reasonableness standard balances a state's legitimate governmental interests against the extent to which a questioned practice intrudes upon an individual's Fourth Amendment interests. 3 3 Reasonableness is determined based on the facts known to the police at the time the intrusion occurs. 3 4 In evaluating the legitimacy of the governmental interests involved, the Court considers the degree to which law enforcement will be hindered if a practice is not allowed. The Court may also look to prevailing rules in individual jurisdictions and the historical pedigree of a practice to determine reasonableness. 3 6 While the Court will not merely rubber stamp a practice because it is long established, a "clear consensus among the States" is carefully considered by the Court. 3 7 Likewise, the judgment of Congress that a practice is reasonable also carries weight with the Court. 3 8
B. THE PURPOSES OF THE KNOCK-AND-ANNOUNCE REQUIREMENT
Like the Fourth Amendment, the knock-and-announce rule protects the security, privacy, and property interests of people in their homes. The knock-and-announce rule requires that police officers give notice of both their authority and purpose to the occupants of a for justifying police "stop and frisk" searches).
32 E.g., Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 258 (1980) (applying reasonableness to a search conducted pursuant to a valid warrant); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (same). 33 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-55 (1979) . The balancing of interests under the rubric of reasonableness is the "key principle" of the Fourth Amendment. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12 (1981) . The Fourth Amendment protects people's "privacy, dignity, and security" interests against "certain arbitrary and invasive acts by officers of the Government or those acting at their direction." Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1989 204, 222 (1981) . The Court looks at local police department policies to determine the extent to which departments actually rely on a particular practice. Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1985) . 36 Garner, 471 U.S. at 13-18; Watson, 423 U.S. at 420-22. The degree to which the Court has relied on history for determining reasonableness is discussed infra at notes 215-246 and accompanying text.
37 Payton, 445 U.S. at 590, 600 (clear consensus of states particularly helpful "when the constitutional standard is as amorphous as the word 'reasonable' and when custom and contemporary norms necessarily play such a large role in the constitutional analysis"). 38 Id. at 590.
residence to be searched. 39 Before breaking and entering the premises to search, officers must also give the occupants a reasonable opportunity to voluntarily allow the police to enter. 40 Police officers must follow the knock-and-announce rule regardless of whether they have a warrant, because the knock-and-announce rule serves several important purposes. 41 First, the rule reduces the risk of violence during a police entry. A forced, unannounced entry is "conducive to a violent confrontation between the occupant and individuals who enter his home without proper notice." 4 2 Unannounced entries put the officers involved at risk of being shot by frightened homeowners. 43 Moreover, the rule also reduces the risk to innocent persons who may be in the house at the time of the search. 44 Second, the rule protects the privacy inter- The method of enforcing the law exemplified by this search is one which not only violates legal rights of defendant but is certain to involve the police in grave troubles if continued. That it did not do so on this occasion was due to luck more than to foresight. Many homeowners in this crime-beset city doubtless are armed. When a woman sees a strange man, in plain clothes, prying up her bedroom window and climbing in, her natural impulse would be to shoot. A plea of justifiable homicide might result awkwardly for enforcement officers. But an officer seeing a gun being drawn on him might shoot first. Under the circumstances of this case, I should not want the task of convincing a jury that it was not murder. I have no reluctance in condemning as unconstitutional a method of law enforcement so reckless and so fraught with danger and discredit to the law enforcement agencies themselves. ests of the occupants of the house. 45 Although there is obviously no right to refuse entry to an officer armed with a valid search warrant, 46 the occupants of a house to be searched have a privacy interest in activities not subject to the warrant. 47 Additionally, making the police request entry minimizes the possibility of a forced entry into the wrong home, 48 and legitimizes the intrusion. 49 Third, requiring police to knock and announce before forcibly entering a residence protects the homeowner's property interests. 5 0 A person should be given the opportunity to voluntarily submit to a search before having his property damaged. 5 ' When there is no property damage, 5 2 courts tend to be more lenient towards police noncompliance with the announcement rule.
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C.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE KNOCK-AND-ANNOUNCE RULE
English Common Law Predecessors
The common law knock-and-announce rule was first judicially recognized in 1603. 49 People v. Casias, 563 P.2d 926, 933 n.12 (Colo. 1977) (en banc) ("Advising a citizen whose house is about to be searched pursuant to a warrant gives additional legitimacy to the procedure in the eyes of the citizen.").
50 Lord Mansfield gave this eloquent defense of the knock-and-announce rule:
The ground of it is this; that otherwise the consequences would be fatal: for it would leave the family within, naked and exposed to thieves and robbers. It is much better therefore, says the law, that you should wait for another opportunity, than do an act of violence, which may probably be attended with such dangerous consequences. Lee v. Ganser, 1 Cowp. In all cases when the King is party, the sheriff (if the doors be not open) may break the party's house, either to arrest him, or to do other execution of the K[ing]'s process, if otherwise he cannot enter. But before he breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of his coming, and to make request to open doors.., for the law without default in the owner abhors destruction or breaking of any house (which is for the habitation and safety of man) by which great damage and inconvenience might ensue to the party, when no default is in him; for perhaps he did not know of the process, of which, if he had notice, it is to be presumed that he would obey it .... 55 The broad holding of Semayne's Case was adopted by the foremost English treatise writers of the period. 56 While there was argument among the treatise writers over the circumstances in which doors could be broken at all, 57 there was no disagreement over the rule that when doors were to be broken, even on a warrant for a felony, announcement was a precondition to the breaking. 5 8 The rule was also present in books intended for those executing such warrants. 59 The presence of announcement requirements in these books strongly suggests that announcement was a widespread practice at common law during the Eighteenth Century.
The first reported application of the announcement requirement in a criminal case was in Curtis' Case. 60 In that case, the Court of King's Bench held that officers who were serving an arrest warrant for breach of the peace could break down doors after "having demanded admittance and given due notice of their warrant." 6 
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[Vol. 86 not require the officers to recite any particular formula to satisfy the notice requirement. Rather, the court held that "it is sufficient that the party hath notice, that the officer cometh not as a mere trespasser, but claiming to act under a proper authority ....
-62
The English courts affirmed this holding in subsequent criminal cases. 63 Although no early English case specifically excludes felony cases from the announcement rule, the extent to which the rule applied in felony cases remains unclear. 64 An early nineteenth-century decision reserved the question of applying the notice requirement to felonies. 65 In light of the unqualified comments found in contemporary treatises, however, it appears that announcement did occur in most, if not all, cases of criminal arrests in the home, regardless of whether the suspect was wanted for a felony or other crime.
Transplanting the Rule to America
The knock-and-announce rule was embraced in the United States prior to the ratification of the Constitution. 66 Today, forty-three states and the federal government recognize the knock-and-announce rule. 8 3 The federal government adopted the knock-and-announce rule by statute in 1917.84 Thirty-three states and the District of Columbia have statutes requiring prior notice for a forcible entry either to arrest or search. 8 5 Nine other states impose the knock-and-announce rule by judicial decision. 8 6 American courts have developed three exceptions to the announcement rule that apply in exigent circumstances: (1) apprehen-81 All of these cases fit very clearly into the "exigent circumstances" exceptions which apply to the knock-and-announce rule today. E.g., Androscoggin R.R. sion of peril, (2) useless gesture, and (3) destruction of evidence. The oldest of these is the apprehension of peril exception. 8 7 The exception is triggered when officers executing a warrant have a reasonable belief that an announcement prior to entry will increase the likelihood of injury to either themselves or others. Modern courts are generally sympathetic to the police when the police know the suspect is armed and the surrounding circumstances indicate danger. 88 However, the fact that a suspect is known to have a weapon is not enough on its own to trigger the exception. 89 Announcement is excused when, in addition to knowledge that the occupant of a house is armed, the police are investigating a violent crime, 90 or have specific knowledge that a suspect has used a weapon criminally or threatened to use a weapon to avoid arrest. 9 1 At the outer limits of the exception, courts sometimes allow entries when the police do not know if a suspect is armed, but the circumstances at the scene are sufficiently 89 See United States v. Lucht, 18 F.3d 541 (8th Cir.) (unannounced entry illegal even though police knew suspect had weapons in house, because police had no indication that suspect was violent or inclined to use the weapons), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 363 (1994); Poole v. United States, 630 A.2d 1109, 1118 (D.C. App. 1993) (evidence that a suspect has a weapon "insufficient," police must also show reason to believe "there was a realistic possibility that the occupant or occupants would use the weapons against them"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 160 (1994) . But see United States v. Buckley, 4 F.3d 552, 558 (7th Cir. 1993) (unannounced entry legal where "the officers knew that the defendants possessed a pit bull and firearms"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1084 (1994) .
90 E.g., Poole, 630 A.2d at 1109 (fact that police were investigating an armed robbery, and suspect had been charged with assaulting a police officer excused delay of only ten seconds after announcement prior to forcible entry); Power v. State, 605 So. 2d 856, 862-63 (Fla. 1992) (invoking exception because police were investigating a murder, and the suspect had committed armed robbery of a deputy, and also had used a gun or a knife in several rapes), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1037 (1993) .
91 People v. Hardin, 535 N.E.2d 1044, 1045-46 (Il. App. Ct 1989) (officers had previously been threatened while serving similar warrant on defendant). threatening.
2
The second exception to the knock-and-announce rule is the "useless gesture" exception. 93 Courts regard announcement as a "useless gesture" when the occupants of the house already have notice of the officers' purpose and authority. 9 4 Thus, if the police are in hot pursuit of a suspect, notice is not required. 95 Similarly, announcement is not required when police know a dwelling is vacant or the occupants are not home. 96 Where the occupants' conduct at the scene of the entry is used to justify an unannounced entry under the useless gesture exception, courts generally follow the Supreme Court's guidelines from Miller v. United States. 9 7 The Miller test provides that officers need to be "virtually certain" that the occupants of a house are aware of the officers' authority and purpose. 98 Relevant facts justifying a "virtually certain" belief include a suspect's knowledge that the police are looking for him, 99 the police noticing that the house's occupants observed their arrival, 0 0 and the sound of people running from the door. 101 The third exception to the knock-and-announce rule is known as the destruction of evidence exception. 10 
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[Vol. 86 to shut the door."1 4 The officers broke the door chain and entered the apartment." 15 Miller argued that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the police entered without announcing their purpose." 6 However, the Supreme Court did not reach the constitutional issue. The Court declared the arrest illegal, and suppressed the evidence found during the search."1 7 They based their decision on the law of the District of Columbia," 8 which set up criteria to judge arrests "identical with those embodied in 18 U.S.C. § 3109."11 9
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, explained that the knockand-announce rule is "deeply rooted in our heritage and should not be given grudging application." 120 and the safety of police.' 25 Justice Brennan noted that some state cases had carved out exceptions to the knock-and-announce rule, 126 but reserved the question of whether exigent circumstances justified noncompliance with § 3109.127 However, Justice Brennan did expressly acknowledge that an exception occurs when officers are "virtually certain" that a suspect already knows their purpose.' 28 In that case, he noted, announcement would be a "useless gesture" and would 14 Id. 115 Id. at 303-04. Miller and Byrd were both arrested after the officers entered the apartment. The officers found the marked $100 in their ensuing search. not be required. 129 Applying that standard, the Court found that the officers were not "virtually certain" that Miller knew their purpose.
130
The Court stepped back from the Miller "virtually certain" standard in Ker v. California. 13 
34
The plurality opinion, written by Justice Clark, held that the entry was reasonable by Fourth Amendment standards.' 3 5 Justice Clark evaluated the lawfulness of the arrest under California law.' 36 The California courts recognized an exception to the knock-and-announce rule for cases in which officers "in good faith" believe that evidence 129 Id.
130 Id. at 310-13. The Court held that Miller's attempt to close the door was an ambiguous act, in light of the time of the entry, the fact that the police were not in uniform, and the fact that his query of the officers' purpose went unanswered.
131 374 U.S. 23 (1963). Between Miler and Ker, the Court addressed the knock-andannounce issue briefly in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The primary issue in Wong Sun was whether statements gathered during a warrantless arrest conducted without probable cause were admissible evidence. The government argued that the suspect's conduct at the door when the police called gave the police probable cause to enter. An officer knocked at the door of the suspect's laundromat (which also contained his residence) two hours before the laundromat opened for business, and claimed to be a customer. When the ruse failed, the officer identified himself as a narcotics officer, but did not identify his purpose. The suspect slammed the door shut and ran away down the hall. To make an arrest,... in all cases a peace officer, may break open the door or window of the house in which the person to be arrested is, or in which... [he has] reasonable grounds for believing the person to be, after having demanded admittance and explained the purpose for which admittance is desired.
would be destroyed if they knocked and announced their purpose. 13 7 Evaluating the facts of the case under this standard, the plurality concluded that the arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
8
However, the plurality made no attempt to probe the scope of exigent circumstances which could justify a lack of announcement.
Justice Brennan 139 dissented from the part of the plurality opinion upholding the search under the Fourth Amendment.1 40 Brennan felt that all unannounced entries violate the Fourth Amendment unless they fit into three sharply limited exceptions to the announcement rule:
(1) where the persons within already know of the officers' authority and purpose, or (2) where the officers are justified in the belief that persons within are in imminent peril of bodily harm, or (3) where those within . .. are then engaged in activity which justifies the officers in the belief that an escape or the destruction of evidence is being attempted.
41
Moreover, Justice Brennan sharply criticized a blanket exception allowing unannounced police entries into homes based on past police experience that "other narcotics suspects had responded to police announcements by attempting to destroy evidence," since that would create an "exception that [would] devour the rule." 14 2 Brennan believed that allowing an exception in the absence of an objective indication that the occupants of the home were aware of the police presence would violate the presumption of innocence, since the entry would have to be justified on the assumption that the occupants would resist or further violate the law upon announcement. 4 3 The Court held an unannounced entry through an unlocked door illegal in Sabbath v. United States.' 44 In Sabbath, the Court considered the level of force required to qualify as a breaking under 18 137 People v. Maddox, 294 P.2d 6, 9 (Cal.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 858 (1956) . Justice Traynorjustified the exception by reasoning that since § 844 is a codification of the common law, it should be interpreted in light of the common law exceptions for apprehension of peril and destruction of evidence. Id.
138 Justification for the unannounced entry was found because of the officers' belief that Ker had narcotics which were easily destroyed, and the officers' past experience that narcotics suspects often tried to destroy evidence when police announced their presence. In addition, "Ker's furtive conduct in eluding them shortly before the arrest was ground for the belief that he might well have been expecting the police." Ker, 374 U.S. at 40. The "furtive conduct" was a U-turn in the middle of a block while police were secretly following his car home. Id. at 27. However, there was no indication that Ker was aware that the police were following him at that point. Id. at 60-61 (opinion of Brennan, J. herself a former Drug Enforcement Administration informant. 5 4 On November 22, 1992, the informant, wired with a body microphone, went to the house and purchased marijuana from Jacobs. 155 The police recorded their conversations and the transaction. 15 6 On the next day, the informant was wired again and sent to the house to buy methamphetamine. 15 7 The informant was successful, and the second transaction was also captured on tape.' 5 8
One month later, on December 30, 1992, the informant arranged to purchase drugs from Wilson at a local convenience store.' 5 9 This time, however, the informant was not wired with any listening devices.' 60 The informant went to the convenience store, where the police set up surveillance and waited for Wilson to arrive.' 6 1 When Wilson arrived, the informant climbed in Wilson's pickup truck. 62 The informant testified that before the sale, Wilson asked her if she was working for the police.' 63 The informant told Wilson she was not.' 64 At trial, the informant claimed that Wilson threatened to kill her if she was working for the police. 165 Wilson also allegedly made her lift her shirt to check for listening devices.' 66 Satisfied that the police were not involved, Wilson sold the informant marijuana. However, Wilson did not have change for the informant, so the two drove to another store to make change. 16 8 On the way, Wilson brandished a semi-automatic pistol and again threatened to kill the informant if she was working for the police. 169 After returning to the first store, the informant met the police and told them about the threat. 170 The next day, the police officers applied for and obtained a warrant to search Wilson The officers executed the search warrant later that afternoon. 173 When the officers arrived at Wilson's house, they found the main door open, and could see Jacobs through the screen door.
1 74 As they opened the unlocked screen door and entered the home, the officers identified themselves and announced that they had a warrant. 175 The police did not have their weapons drawn as they entered the house.' 76 Once inside the house, the police found marijuana, methamphetamine, valium, drug paraphernalia, the handgun allegedly used to threaten the informant, and ammunition.
17 7 The police also found Wilson in the bathroom flushing marijuana down the toilet. 78 Wilson and Jacobs were arrested and charged with delivery of a controlled substance, possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and possession of drug paraphernalia.
1 79 Wilson was also charged with "terroristic threatening" for her threats against the informant. 1 8 0 Wilson and Jacobs were tried separately.18 1 Before trial, Wilson moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search. 182 Wilson claimed the search was invalid because the police officers failed to knock and announce their purpose before entering. 183 The trial court summarily denied the motion to suppress. Justice Thomas then traced the history of the knock-and-announce rule, noting that the early English common law courts recognized the knock-and-announce principle. 193 Id. at 1915. 194 Id. at 1917. Thomas provides three examples to support this proposition. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991) (analysis of the common law definitions of"seizure" and "arrest" used to determine that a fleeing suspect has not been arrested until caught by an officer); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418-420 (1976) (using common law right of an officer to arrest without a warrant in holding that a warrantless arrest by a postal inspector who has reason to believe that the arrestee has committed a felony is reasonable); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) ("The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens."). The Court went on to show that the knock-and-announce rule was carried over to American law from the common law. 20 0 Furthermore, the Court noted that some states even passed statutes specifically adopting the common law view "that the breaking of the door of a dwelling was permitted once admittance was refused." 20 Thomas concluded his historical analysis by showing that nineteenth-century American courts also embraced the common law principle, 20 2 and that prior Supreme Court cases acknowledged that the common law "principle of announcement is 'embedded in Anglo-American law."' 203 In light of the "longstanding common law endorsement of the practice of announcement," the Court concluded that the "Framers of the Fourth Amendment thought that the method of an officer's entry into a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a seizure." 20 4 Therefore, the Court held that "in some circumstances an officer's unannounced entry into a home might be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment." 20 5 However, the Court did not address the circumstances that would make an unannounced entry unreasonable by Fourth Amendment standards. Instead, the Court expressly left that matter to the lower courts.
0 6
The Court did, however, emphasize that the "Fourth Amendment's flexible requirement of reasonableness" does not mandate that officers must knock and announce before every search.
0 7
The Court observed that at common law, at the time of the framing, the announcement rule had not been conclusively extended to felony cases, though the rule eventually expanded to cover felony arrests. 2 08 The Court continued with a battery of nineteenth-century cases dealing with common law exceptions to the knock-and-announce requirement.
20 9 Justice Thomas concluded that although an unannounced search may be unconstitutional, countervailing law enforcement interests can establish that an unannounced entry may be reasonable.
10
The Court refused to consider the State's argument that the officers had a reasonable fear for their safety and that prior announcement would create an unreasonable risk that the petitioner would destroy evidence. 2 1 ' Justice Thomas noted that the Arkansas Supreme Court had not ruled on the sufficiency of these issues, and left the issue for the state court to decide on remand. The Court did indicate, however, that "these concerns may well provide the necessaryjustification for the unannounced entry in this case." 2 1 2 The Court also refused to consider the State's argument that the exclusion of evidence from searches made unreasonable by an unannounced entry is not constitutionally required, because that issue had not been adjudicated by the Arkansas courts and was outside of the limited issue on which the Court granted certiorari. In Wilson v. Arkansas, the Court correctly reversed the Arkansas Supreme Court's ruling. However, the Court's relegation of the knock-and-announce requirement to a "factor" in the reasonableness inquiry undervalues the interests served by the knock-and-announce rule. The Court came to its determination by looking only at the common law history of the rule and its exceptions. Although a historical analysis is useful to a determination of Fourth Amendment reasonableness, an inquiry which looks only at history is inherently incomplete, and potentially ignores countervailing modern interests. By closely examining the history of the knock-and-announce rule, and balancing the interests involved, this Note concludes that unannounced entries should be presumptively unreasonable. Unannounced entries should only be allowed when a "reasonably prudent officer would be warranted in the belief, based on specific and articulable facts, and not on a mere inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,"' 2 1 4 that exigent circumstances exist at the site of the search.
A. THE COURT INCORRECTLY APPLIED THE REASONABLENESS INQUIRY
Reasonableness Cannot be Determined Solely by Historical Analysis
The Court's sole reliance upon the common law distorted the test of reasonableness used to determine the scope of the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches. While the common law may "be instructive" 2 1 5 about or "[shed] light" 2 1 6 on the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, history is only one element out of several the Court has used to determine the reasonableness of a search. 222 In Hodari D., a police officer chased a teen who ran when he saw the policeman's car approach. While being pursued, the teen threw away what later turned out to be a piece of crack cocaine. The government admitted that the arrest was unlawful and the only issue before the Court was whether Hodari had been "seized" for Fourth Amendment purposes at the time he threw away the cocaine. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment was not implicated because Hodari had not been seized at the time he abandoned the cocaine. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 622-23, 626.
common law definition of "arrest," but also considered and rejected an expansion of the meaning of "seizure" on policy grounds. 2 23 The fundamental problem with Hodari's claim was not that the common law would not regard a chase as an arrest, but rather that the common usage of the word "seizure" did not "remotely apply" to the facts of the case. 2 24 Thus, the historical definition of "arrest" was not the sole basis for the Court's decision.
Watson, the second case relied upon by the Court, involved the admissibility of evidence seized after a warrantless arrest by a postal inspector who admittedly had time to secure a warrant. 225 Here, the Court consulted the common law to show that arrest without a warrant was permissible under the Constitution. However, the Court's finding was heavily influenced by the fact that Congress had given postal inspectors the authority to make warrantless arrests. 226 The Court was also swayed by the knowledge that nearly all states allowed warrantless arrests for felonies by statute. 2 27 Though the Court did not engage in balancing to determine reasonableness in Watson, its decision was based as much, if not more, on current state and federal government statutory law than on the common law arrest power. 228 Thus, the Court's method of analysis in Watson is markedly different from the Court's method of analysis in Wilson, and cannot support a reasonableness determination based entirely on historical analysis.
Carroll, a prohibition-era case relied upon by the Court, involved the admissibility of alcohol seized during a warrantless search of an automobile. 229 The Court in Carroll held that a warrantless search of an automobile was not unreasonable. 23 0 Carroll was a case of first impression, so the Court attempted to determine what "unreasonable search" meant to the Framers of the Fourth Amendment. 2 31 The Court, however, also looked to its own analogous precedent and offered a practical argument against using warrants in automobile searches: an automobile can be moved out of ajurisdiction in the time required to secure a warrant.
32
Both Justices Scalia 2 33 and Thomas 234 have cited Carroll for the proposition that "[t] he Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted .... *"235 Both Justices use Carroll to justify an analysis which regards the meaning of "unreasonable search" in 1791 as dispositive of the definition of the phrase "unreasonable searches" in the Fourth Amendment. 2 36 However, the full quote of Carroll's endorsement of historical analysis rejects the use of history as the sole source of determining reasonableness: "[t] he Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted and in a manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens." 237 Thus, none of the cases Justice Thomas cites to support his purely historical analysis of the knock-and-announce requirement validate the use of history as the sole guide to determine Fourth Amendment reasonableness.
The Garner Problem
The key problem with using a purely historical analysis of the Fourth Amendment is that society and law enforcement have changed substantially since 1791. 238 Due to these dramatic changes, reliance on common law rules can produce "a mistaken literalism that ignores the purposes of a historical inquiry." 239 Tennessee v. Garner illustrates that the Court will consider societal changes to determine the meaning of "unreasonable search."
Garner involved the constitutionality of a statute which allowed police to use deadly force to effect an arrest 240 A Tennessee police officer shot and killed Garner as he fled the scene of a burglary, although the officer believed Garner was unarmed. 24 1 The Court rejected the argument the clear common law rule allowing officers to kill all fleeing felons was dispositive on the reasonableness question. 242 Changes in the types of crimes that are considered felonies, the manner in which felonies are punished, and the types of weaponry available convinced the Court that following the common law rule would not serve Fourth Amendment purposes. 243 Therefore, the Court balanced the "unmatched" intrusion of deadly force against the state's necessity to use the force, and determined that the use of deadly force against fleeing felons is allowable only in certain circumstances. 244 Wilson's historical analysis presents some of the same concerns found in Garner. For example, the increased sophistication of weaponry noted by the Garner court also has implications for the execution of search warrants. 245 Officers at common law did not have to serve warrants on suspects armed with automatic weapons. Many people, particularly in the law enforcement community, argue that the knockand-announce rule is an anachronism in light of current dangers.
246
In the face of such criticism, a purely historical analysis is a weak basis of decision. If the Wilson Court was interested in maintaining the protection of the interests served by the knock-and-announce rule, it should have demonstrated that the interests served by the rule still apply in 1995. This type of inquiry requires balancing, rather than 240 Gamer, 471 U.S. at 5-7. 241 Id. at 3-4. 242 Id. at 13. 243 Id. at 1--15. The Court concluded, "[t]hough the common-law pedigree of Tennessee's rule is pure on its face, changes in the legal and technological context mean the rule is distorted almost beyond recognition when literally applied." Id. at 15.
244 Id. at 7-12. The Court also looked to the prevailing trends in relevant state statutes, as well as local police department policies to determine that the rule was not necessary for effective law enforcement. Id. at 15-20.
245 Some criminals are armed with military style assault rifles and other automatic weapons. See Allegro, supra note 238, at 560.
246 For example, one commentator writes:
One of the most troublesome requirements regarding [search warrant] execution is that which requires that notice be given prior to forcible entry.... officers recognize what the courts call the [anachronism] of the notice rule in an era when the suspect often has the opportunity to injure the officer or to efficiently dispose of evidence.
JOHN C. KLOrrER, LEGAL GUiDE FOR POLICE: CONSTITUTIONAL IssuEs (3d ed. 1992). Cf. Allegro, supra note 238, at 562-68.
merely referencing, the interests involved.
B. THE BALANCING OF INTERESTS FAVORS A STRONGER RULE
The interests protected by the knock-and-announce rule continue to be relevant today. Unannounced raids by police invade the personal security interest protected by the Fourth Amendment and are extremely dangerous to both police and those inside the home.
47
The danger to the police comes from several factors. An unannounced entry by officers is a terrifying act to the person being targeted. Moreover, no-knock raids are often conducted by plainclothes officers, increasing the chance that a panicked homeowner will think that the invaders are criminals. 248 Guns are present in nearly half of all American homes, 249 and nearly all states give homeowners the authority to use deadly force to protect themselves and their homes. 2 50 Frightened homeowners with guns may pose a significant threat to the safety of police (especially plainclothes police) serving a warrant. he entry is made or attempted in a violent, riotous, or tumultuous manner, and he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent an assault upon, or offer of personal violence to, him or another then in the dwelling. . . ." 720 ILCS § 5/7-2 (1994). Thus, a man successfully defended a murder charge when he shot plainclothes police officers who came to serve an arrest warrant at night, and were pounding on his back door. People v. Lavac, 192 N.E. 568 (Ill. 1934).
251 For example, in 1989, in a nighttime raid, Florida police clad in dark clothing and black masks notified Charles DiGristine that they had a warrant to search his house by setting off a concussion grenade and breaking down the front door. BovARD, supra note 248, at 236. As his wife screamed, he ran frightened to his bedroom to get his pistol. Id. An agent ran into his bedroom, and in the exchange of gunfire, the police officer was killed. Id. DiGristine was tried for the officer's murder but was acquitted. Id. The jury foreman commented "[h]e was totally petrified, and I would have been too. Myself, under the same circumstances, would have more than likely done the same thing, if not quicker and with more firepower." Joe Hallinan, Gestapo-like Tactics Used in Drug Raids, Dss MOINEs REG., Nov. 6, 1993, at IT, 2T. raids are not a rare occurrence, 252 and when an unannounced entry does occur, innocent people at home can be victimized by nervous police executing the unannounced entry. For example, SWAT police broke into Robin Pratt's home unannounced to execute an arrest warrant on her husband. 253 While searching the apartment, an officer rounded a corner and came upon Mrs. Pratt.
2 54 The SWAT officer pointed his gun at her and ordered her to get down, and while she was complying, she looked up at the officer and said, "Please don't hurt my children." 255 The officer then shot and killed Mrs. Pratt.
256
The right to privacy in one's home is at the core of the Fourth Amendment. 2 57 The Court has emphasized the importance of this right in a variety of circumstances. 258 Some critics of the knock-andannounce rule argue that the residents of homes subject to search under warrant have no real expectation of privacy, since the officers have the right to enter after the announcement. 260 An unannounced raid can expose people who are engaging in sexual intercourse or in various states of undress. See supra note 47. This is especially likely when raids are conducted at night or at early morning hours. For example, Drug Enforcement Administration agents arrived at the home of Sina Brush just after dawn in the fall of 1991. Joe Hallinan, Drug Wars: Fervor Often Injures The Innocent, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Sept. 26, 1993, at A20. She heard a commotion outside, and right after she got out of bed to look, the door slammed open and agents flooded into her home. Id. The agents forced her and her daughter, both of whom were clad only in underwear, to kneel handcuffed in the middle of their main room while the officers searched the premises. Id. The officers did not let the women dress. See id. No drugs were found, but Ms. Brush described the experience thus, "[the officer guarding me in the nounced entry is by police, victims of these searches feel a special sense of violation and fear. 26 1 When police do not know of specific facts that give them reason to believe that the occupants of a home will resist the officers or will frustrate the search, the police should not be allowed to subject citizens to these risks.
The state's primary interest in unannounced entries is that they allow police to take command of the search scene quickly and efficiently. 262 The benefits flowing from this are two-fold. First, it reduces the opportunity occupants have to destroy evidence. 2 63 In many cases, particularly those involving narcotics, the targeted items are small and easily disposable. 2 64 However, barging into a home unannounced is not necessary to prevent destruction of drugs that may be in that home. 265 Less violent alternatives, such as shutting off the water to the house or using a ruse to gain entry, should be tried first.266 At heart, this choice of method is an efficiency choice. It is certainly more efficient for the police to kick in the front door than to shut off the water to a home or wait to capture the owner outside. However, efficiency concerns do not necessarily override Fourth Amendment interests. In fact, the Supreme Court specifically remain room] placed himself at an angle where he could see my whole body exposed and he was just leering at me," she said. "He was sitting there with his hands behind his head and his feet stretched out in a chair ... and I felt that was a violation of my female self." Id.
261 The Ninth Circuit expressed the terror as follows:
The fear of a smashing in of doors by government agents is based upon much more than a concern that our privacy will be disturbed. It is based upon concern for our safety and the safety of our families. Indeed, the minions of dictators do not kick in doors for the mere purpose of satisfying some voyeuristic desire to peer around and then go about their business. Something much more malevolent and dangerous is afoot when they take those actions. It is that which strikes terror into the hearts of their victims. 265 See Garcia, supra note 84, at 714 (shutting off water, covertly installing mesh in the pipes to catch drugs, using a ruse to gain entry, and apprehending the owner of the dwelling outside prior to entry). The second state interest no-knock entries serve is officer safety. The Court considers the safety of officers serving a valid warrant a "weighty" interest. 270 An officer executing a warrant is most vulnerable when attempting to enter a house. 2 71 Although the officer's position is often known by those inside, since the officer will probably be near. a door, the officer does not know the location of the house's occupants. 2 7 2 The officer is further disadvantaged by not knowing the layout of the dwelling, which can provide hiding places for occupants who are determined to resist. 2 73 Forcing an officer to announce his presence also can give occupants time to arm themselves and prepare for confrontation. 2 74 To minimize these risks, and to promote the legitimate interest of the state in enforcing drug laws, police claim they need the discretion to pursue unannounced entries if they feel that is the safest option. However, as shown above, 27 6 safety is not necessarily maximized by allowing officers to enter a house unannounced. Because of the large security and privacy interests at stake, police should not have unchecked discretion in this matter. Buie applied the Terry standard in the context of the protective sweep, requiring that officers show specific, articulable facts "which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer" to believe that a person posing a threat is on the premises.
285
Buie's balancing is appropriate in the knock-and-announce context. Both the protective sweep in Buie and the unannounced entry in Wilson occurred ancillary to police activity pursuant to a lawful warrant. When arrest warrants are served on suspects in violent crimes, the danger faced by officers is at least as great as that faced by officers serving a search warrant. The standard police should be required to meet to justify the intrusion of an unannounced entry should be no lower than the Buie standard. Thus, unannounced entries should be presumptively unreasonable. The presumption should be rebuttable only when the police can show specific, articulable facts that would allow a reasonable officer in the same situation to conclude that the occupants of the dwelling are already aware of the officers' authority and purpose, or that an unannounced entry is necessary for safety or to prevent the destruction of evidence. This standard respects state interests because it will allow police to take appropriate measures in cases where there are facts warranting an unannounced entry.
2 86 By circumscribing police discretion, it protects the security, privacy, and carrying out a lawful arrest from surprise attack. Id. at 327. property interests of the subject of the search. 28 7
C. HISTORY AND EXPERIENCE SUPPORT A STRONGER RULE
A close look at the common law history of the knock-and-announce rule and recent Congressional experience with no-knock warrants supports a rule of presumptive unreasonableness for no-knock entries. In the Wilson opinion, Justice Thomas stated that "the Framers of the Fourth Amendment thought that the method of an officer's entry into a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search or seizure. '28 8 This understates the importance of the announcement rule in the early years of the republic. First, at common law, the scope of exceptions to the knock-andannounce rule was very limited. 289 All of the early cases with exceptions to the knock-and-announce rule cited by Justice Thomas in the Wilson opinion involve situations where there were clearly specific, articulable facts supporting the decision not to announce. 2 90 Moreover, the strong language of the treatises, 29 1 as well as the very small number of cases where there was no announcement, strongly suggests that announcement was the accepted procedure. 292 Likewise, recent experience has convinced Congress that careful controls are needed for police conducting unannounced entries. In order to help fight the drug war, in 1970, Congress passed a controversial statute that allowed judges to issue no-knock warrants. 2 9 7 During the four years that the statute was in force, the Congressional Record was filled with articles detailing abuses of the no-knock system, and stories of innocent people killed in no-knock searches. 298 Dissatisfaction and concern over the constitutionality of the statute 299 grew until the statute was repealed in 1974.300 Since that time, even though Congress has remained committed to fighting the drug war, it has never returned to the no-knock warrant. The experience of the 1970s shows that unannounced entries must be held in check.
D. THE IMPACT OF TREATING ANNOUNCEMENT AS ONLY A "FACTOR" IN THE REASONABLENESS ANALYSIS
Treating the presence or absence of an announced entry as a mere factor in the reasonableness equation gives a wide berth for judges to apply or ignore the rule as they choose. This will result in inadequate protection of the interests served by the knock-and-announce rule. The Court left to the lower courts the task of determining when a knock is or isn't required under the Fourth the Fourth Amendment should be applied in the knock-and-announce context. In the face of this lack of direction from the Supreme Court, courts will necessarily look at previous precedent for direction. 3 0 2 For example, federal courts will look at the case law under 18 U.S.C. § 3109, because § 3109 has been construed to apply the common law announcement requirement and exceptions which formed the basis of the Court's opinion in Wilson. 30 3 Likewise, state knock-and-announce statutes generally have been read to codify common law requirements. 30 4 Since courts have already been interpreting common law knock-and-announce requirements, the Court has in effect told lower courts to continue applying the knock-and-announce rule as they have done in the past. 30 5 Unfortunately, some courts have been very lax in enforcing the knock-and-announce rule. 305 See Commonwealth v. Wornum, 656 N.E.2d 579, 581 (Mass. November 3, 1995) (after determining that an unannounced entry was not unreasonable under common law principles, the court notes Wilson and states that the entry was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment for the same reasons as in the common law analysis).
306 E.g., United States v. Knapp, 1 F.3d 1026, 1030-31 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding no exigent circumstances, but holding a 10 second delay after knocking with no response sufficient to find a constructive refusal under 18 U.S.C. § 3109; forced entry reasonable even though officers knew Knapp was an amputee who could not move quickly); United States v. Moore, 956 F.2d 843, 849-51 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding no exigent circumstances tojustify a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3109, the court applies a "good faith" exception to knock requirement). 307 Widson, 115 S. Ct. at 1919 (the state's exigent circumstances arguments "may well provide the necessaryjustification for the unannounced entry in this case"). Moreover, the opinion surveys the common law exceptions to the knock-and-announce rule, Id. at 1918-19, but doesn't survey the policies in favor of the knock-and-announce rule or explain when an unannounced entry would be unreasonable. courts may not be inclined to strengthen their enforcement of the knock-and-announce rule. 308 The future of the knock-and-announce rule is further clouded by other recent Supreme Court action on the issue. In particular, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in State v. Stevens less than ten days after the decision in Wilson. 30 9 Stevens issued a blanket rule that police need never knock-and-announce when they are looking for "evidence of drug dealing." 3 10 The exception in Stevens exempts a large and important category of searches from the coverage of the knock-and-announce rule. At a minimum, the denial of certiorari suggests that the Court does not believe that such a limitation presents a serious Fourth Amendment problem. Courts that have been loosely applying the knock-and-announce rule may take the "broad" exceptions in the Wilson rule and the denial of certiorari in Stevens as a signal that they may continue to apply the knock-and-announce rule loosely. In Wilson v. Arkansas, the Supreme Court held that the knockand-announce rule is only one factor in determining whether a search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The Court came to its determination by looking only at the common law background of the knock-and-announce rule. In doing so, the Court's decision undervalued the important personal security and privacy interests served by police announcement. A balancing of the interests involved, coupled with a proper reading of the history of the rule, shows that a stronger rule is necessary to protect the interests at stake. Instead of making the knock-and-announce rule a factor in the reasonableness equation, the Court should have held that unannounced entries into homes are presumptively unreasonable, unless the police know that the occupant of the home is aware of their purpose, or the police can show reasonable suspicion that announcement would lead to violence or the destruction of evidence. However, the Court announced the constitutionality of the rule in such a mild way, and with so little guidance, that the Court's decision leaves important Fourth Amendment concerns subject to erosion.
MARK JOSEPHSON
308 The Court's holding puts the knock requirement "among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search." Id. at 1918. The Court says that "in some circumstances an unannounced entry into a home might be unreasonable," but never suggests when that would be the case. 
